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“If you want to be rich, you must first build
roads.”(Chinese proverb)
 
Introduction
1 Throughout  the  last  decade  China’s  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  and  economic
exchanges  with  Africa  have  risen  consistently  and  significantly.Even  though  the
spectrum of Chinese activities in Africa is quite large – ranging from retail to agricultural
projects – the bulk of efforts is concentrated in the extractive sector. The rising concern
about diminishing resources as well as competition – real or potential – coincides with
the  arrival  of  new actors  (such  as  India,  Brazil  and  especially  China1)  and  puts  the
substratum-rich African continent into the centre of global stakes. If the scramble for
petroleum generally prevails, other natural resources, such as mineral ore or copper, play
an important role as well. 
Regarding several  points,  the Bélinga iron ore project in Gabon reflects not only the
current Chinese involvement but also the changing nature of its extractive business in
Africa2. On one hand, the growing use of FDI and the role played by multinational firms
lead to the increasing internationalisation of the capital (Alden, Davies, 2006; Levasseur,
2002). At the same time, the recent Chinese interest for the Gabonese iron ore illustrates
the evolving strategic value of different natural resources (Raffestin, 1980) in a certain
economic context. 
Gabon is a sparsely populated state with a total of 1.5 million and a very low density of
inhabitants  per  square  kilometre.  Historically,  one  of  the  major  pillars  of  the
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“Françafrique”, its economy is largely dependant on a petroleum-based rent (Pourtier,
1989; Yates, 1996). The country’s interest for mineral ore expresses a rather recent shift,
knowing that the state’s economy has successively been based on timber,  petroleum,
uranium and manganese. 
2 This case study highlights the role of politics in implementing an investment of this scale
and underlines the interrelation of both political and economic factors in large project
management.  Given the large sums invested,  the number of preliminary construction
works  and the outlook for  jobs,  the Bélinga mining project  has  from the start  been
promoted and qualified as a flagship project for the Gabonese national economy. The
initial Chinese commitment for rapid exploitation and desire to have access to natural
resources converges with the Gabonese aim of diversifying its economy. It also reflects
the  idea  of  a  shared  necessity:  the  need  for  Chinese  firms  to  acquire  international
experience  and  become  more  competitive  facing  the  challenge  of  developing  basic
infrastructure in Gabon3.  While China’s  African policy stresses the feature of  ‘mutual
benefit’ through its investments, it raises the question of if and how it is displayed on the
ground.  Though  the  project  might  affect  the  country’s  spatial  organisation  and  is
expected to stimulate development dynamics, the prospects in a longer term for both
sides need to be analyzed. 
The  death  of  former  president  Omar  Bongo in  June  2009  as  well  as  the  commodity
volatility has however challenged the realisation of the project. The changing domestic
political  context has introduced new risks and costs for the Chinese.  Thus,  since the
signature of the contract in 2006, the delays have been significant. If Chinese operators
have  initially  been  depicted  as  less  profit-orientated  and  sensitive  (than  Western
operators) towards the realities of the host society, recent developments show a different
picture of China’s involvement in Gabon.
3 Regarding research about the extractive sector, two major tendencies appear. On one
hand,  studies  establishing  (at  various  degrees)  a  direct  link  between  resource  rich
countries and the negative impact on their domestic economy still prevail (Ross, 1999;
Soares de Oliveira, 2007). On the other hand, a range of analyses have drawn a more
possibilistic  view around the concepts  of  trajectory and bifurcations4 opposed to the
predominant natural  resource curse approach (Magrin and van Vliet,  2005,  2009).  By
focusing on the evolving strategies around the Bélinga project as well as the potential
development opportunities, the current study adheres to the second pattern.
While analyses and scientific literature about the Chinese involvement in the African
extractive sector have become more and more abundant and diversified over the last
couple of years (Taylor, 2006; Downs, 2007; Ferreira, 2008; Large, 2008; Soares de Oliveira,
2008; Alden, Alves, 2009; Li, 2010; van Vliet, Magrin, 2011), the Gabonese case has been
mostly ignored. The constant postponement of the Bélinga project might partly explain,
why so far, few scholars have taken an interest in this example5. Most of the analyses
regarding Sino-Gabonese relations underline the Bélinga project,  with a focus on the
potential  rivalry  between  traditional  partners  and  China  as  well  as  economic
diversification challenges at a national level. 
4 The present  paper reviews the development opportunities  linked to this  project  and
shows how China’s initial strategic approach in Gabon has progressively been evolving.
Thus,  the  early  stages  of  this  mining  project  provide  an  interesting  insight  of  firm
behaviour and how the different parties involved act and react at the beginning of an
extractive cycle (van Vliet, 1998; Magrin, van Vliet, 2005; Dittgen, 2011).
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5 In this article, we will be examining the three following hypotheses: 
• In regards to the Bélinga project, the preferential political ties and financial support from
the Chinese government facilitate the rapid enforcement.
• This long-term investment creates indirect development opportunities at a local scale.
• However, by focusing on the mining sector, Gabon’s diversification attempt is not leading to
a major change in the structure of its economy despite the infrastructure development at a
regional and national scale. 
6 In order to analyse the evolving nature of the project, it appears necessary to identify the
actors involved and to study under what circumstances the project has been elaborated.
First,  this  study  aims  to  stress  the  entanglement  of  politics  and  economic  interests
regarding the Chinese presence in Gabon. Subsequently, the extractive sector – at the
heart of the Sino-Gabonese relations – as well as the past and present dynamics around
the Bélinga project will be analysed more extensively. Finally, it will be interesting to
assess the impact, the stakes and challenges linked to this long-term investment.
 
New actor, old habit ? A politicized intensification of
economic relations
7 If the increase of the Chinese involvement in Gabon appears to be quite recent, the initial
contact is much older. Diplomatic links between the People’s Republic of China and Gabon
were established in 1974.  This  decision followed Gabon’s  wish for  a  general  political
opening and the coming into power of Omar Bongo in 1967 (Dittgen, 2007; Yates, 2008,
pp. 210-214). His first State visit to China and meeting up with Deng Xiaoping and Mao
Zedong that same year happened at the height of  the Cold War.  Bongo justified this
growing  connection  with  China  and  diversification  of  partnerships  by  his  wish  to
accelerate the country’s development.  Since this trip,  which has set the base for this
cooperation, the relations tied between the two countries have been growing stronger
over the years. During his 41 years in power, the Gabonese president returned to China on
many occasions. If Omar Bongo has been both a symbol and a pillar of the ‘Françafrique’6,
at  the same time he did not neglect other possibilities and was able to diversify the
country’s partnerships. 
8 From an economic point of view, relations with China have remained limited for a long
time and confined to marginal sectors. China’s presence has first been felt through the
dispatch  of  agronomic  and  medical  teams,  the  construction  of  hospitals  and  the
launching of agricultural projects. If Sino-Gabonese relations have gradually expanded to
other fields, it is only from the late 1990s onwards that commercial ties between the two
countries  have  experienced  a  significant  strengthening7.  Currently,  manganese  and
timber exports from Gabon are the most affected by the boom of the Chinese economy
(Tableau  de  bord  de  l’économie,  2008).  China’s  strong  demand  of  mineral  ores  has
furthermore led to an increase of exports by Comilog8. 
If natural resources represent the bulk of Gabon’s trade with China, imports from the
Middle Kingdom – covering a wide range of manufactured products – have remained at a
relatively low level: 45 million € in 2006 and approximately 108 million € in 2009 (World
Trade Atlas database, 2010)9. On the other hand, Gabonese exports towards China have
however  been  growing  considerably.  Evaluated  at  245  million  €  in  2005,  the  latter
experienced a significant rise in 2006 ( F07E  572 million €), reached the highest level in 2008 (
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F0
7E  1.25 billion €) before experiencing a slowing down in 2009 ( F07E  500 million €). In spite of
this temporarily decline and difficulties to obtain precise figures regarding exports in
more recent years, the tendency is leaning towards a continuous increase. 
9 Initially  considered  as  a  marginal  partner,  more  recently  a  number  of  sources  have
already  placed  China  as  Gabon’s  second  largest  customer  behind  the  United  States
(Lafargue, 2005; Report by the Centre for Chinese Studies, 2007; Report by the Economic
Mission of the French Embassy in Libreville, 2002). Nevertheless, the United States remain
the “top customer”,  mainly by acquiring over 50 per cent of Gabon’s petroleum, and
France continues to be Gabon’s leading supplier with a market share of around 35 per
cent10.  Current  developments  point  however  towards  a  changing  situation:  namely  a
decline of exchanges between the “traditional” partner France and its former colony due
to China’s increasing involvement. If it is plausible that in the long run, China might
surpass France as a trading partner, the French’s overall hold and influence in Gabon will
not disappear overnight (Yates, 2008, p. 221). 
10 At the same time, official visits by Chinese dignitaries towards Gabon have increased: the
most relevant being those by former Prime Minister Li Peng in 1997 and President Hu
Jintao in 2004. In regards to the Sino-Gabonese cooperation, the latter reflects a major
turning point. Choosing Gabon as the only destination in Subsaharan Africa, during the
Chinese president's first African political tour, has been interpreted as a result of the
diplomatic influence of the country and mostly of its president Omar Bongo. From an
economic point of view, such events constitute key moments for the establishment and
signature of contracts in various domains. Hence, not only does it illustrate the role of
politics within Sino-African relations, but it also shows that to some degree, the efficiency
of a cooperation manifests itself through the rhythm and the importance of visits11. 
It was in Gabon that president Hu revealed the new Chinese policy towards the African
continent and set the broad outline of the ‘new Sino-African partnership’. One of the key
ideas  put  forward  by  the  Chinese  president  during  his  stay  was  that  Sino-African
diplomacy should have a common interest in transforming the current economic world
order, dominated by the United States12. 
Moreover, the view on the complementary economic links between Africa and China and
the huge potential of cooperation has met the Gabonese ambitions. Jean Ping, former
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  himself  half  Chinese  and  half  Gabonese,  stressed  that
henceforth the priority should go to partners able to guarantee the country’s economic
and social progress. Convinced by the positive impact of Hu Jintao’s visit on the progress
of  economic  and  diplomatic  exchanges  with  China,  both  parties  have  opted  for  a
strengthening of the Libreville-Beijing axis. 
In this context of a developing cooperation, several agreements have been concluded.
China offered a set of grants, interest free loans aimed at projects to be determined by
consent as well as the finalization of cooperation projects undertaken previously. At the
same time, a memorandum of understanding had been negotiated between Unipec – a
subsidiary company of the Sinopec Petroleum group – and Total-Gabon. 
If  the Chinese presence in the field of oil  has until  now been limited to the stage of
research and exploration, the PRC is purchasing an increasing amount of its petroleum
from Gabon13. At the hands of the challenges facing today’s Gabonese oil sector (decrease
in production), the government hopes to revive its main area of revenues through the
growing interest of Chinese companies. As an example,Sinopec has recently confirmed its
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wish to invest in Gabon’s oil sector by taking part in the bid of 42 deepwater petroleum
blocs (Gaboneco, 8th of September 2010). 
11 Beyond the commercial  activities,  Chinese loans,  whether interest-free or prime rate,
have  been  constantly  growing  since  the  beginning  of  2000.  Projects,  such  as  the
construction  of  the  Senate  (2005),  a  new  radio  and  television  complex  (“Cité  de
l’information” in 2007), the “Grand Poubara” hydro electrical dam project ( F07E  292 million
€), the stadium of Sino-Gabonese friendship ( F07E  46 million €) for the 2012 edition of the
‘Africa Cup of Nations’, and above all the Bélinga project (2.2 billion €) have taken the
Sino-Gabonese lending habit to an upgraded level. 
The  change  of  scale  of  the  Sino-Gabonese  relationship  as  well  as  the  fact  that  the
Gabonese  State  henceforth  considers  China  among  its  privileged  partners  can  be
explained by the provision of financial assistance and credit lines at preferential rates.
Gabon’s repeated attempts over the decades to get debt relief from Western donors failed
due  to  high  capita  income  figures14.  In  this  particular  context,  interest-free  or
preferential loans from China came as a welcome alternative (Yates, 2008, p. 210).
Altogether,  it  is  often  thanks  to  diplomatic  and  political  ways  that  the  Gabonese
government has tried to persuade businessmen to invest in Gabon. The political aspect
accounts for  an important part  in regards to bilateral  and multilateral  relations and
reveals the rivalries between various partners. In a longer term, it would be interesting to
assess  to what extent Chinese investment could allow Gabon to be less  economically
dependent on France and International Financial Institutions. On the other hand, it also
depends on Ali Bongo’s political choices; in other words, either opting for a continuation
of privileged Franco-Gabonese relations or a gradual exit of the French fold15. 
12 If  the  Sino-Gabonese  cooperation is  certainly  multiform and covers  areas  of  varying
importance,  at  present “it  is  not possible to speak of  the Chinese presence in Gabon
without mentioning the mega Bélinga project [...]16”, which in scale and impact exceeds
by far  other  projects  launched by the Chinese.  At  the same time,  it  illustrates  their
particular interest for the mining sector. 
 
At the heart of the Sino-Gabonese dynamic: the
mining and the Bélinga project
13 The objective of economic diversification, promoted by Omar Bongo during the mid-1990s
and parallel  to China’s  growing need for basic mineral  products,  has put the mining
sector at the centre of both interests. Mostly interested in iron, manganese, phosphate or
niobium, Chinese actors have established themselves in various locations. However, since
numerous contracts were not signed until the third quarter of 2006 or later, and some
stumbling blocks remain, in most cases operating as such has not yet started17. 
In the field of manganese, two Chinese companies (CICMH18 and Sinosteel) managed to
obtain operating permits in Ndjolé and Mbigou. The first site, located in the Bembélé
mountains, is accessible and near the Transgabonais railway route, thereby facilitating
the transport of mineral towards Libreville. However, the one in Mbigou is situated in a
rugged  area  making  exploitation  very  difficult.  At  present,  the  latter  mine  is  not
economically viable and Sinosteel has therefore returned the license to the Gabonese
State.  Since  operating  permits  are  only  granted  to  companies  incorporated  under
Gabonese law, the Chinese entities interested in manganese in Ndjolé had to merge and
form a Gabonese company19 under  the name of  C.I.C.M.G.  (Compagnie  industrielle  et
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commerciale des mines du Gabon). 
Moreover,  the  Chinese  have expressed their  willingness  to  take over  the manganese
operating permits in Okondja and Franceville, both returned by Brazilian operators. The
latter concentrated their efforts on to the Bélinga project and therefore stopped their
activity in these smaller sites. In addition, the Chinese did obtain an exploration permit
for an iron site in Tchibanga. However, given the limited knowledge of the iron content of
this concession,  the lack of  infrastructure and especially after winning the operating
concession for Bélinga, they soon returned the license to the Gabonese State.
 
Illustration 1 – The Chinese presence in Gabon's mining sector
Source : INC, 2006.
14 If the Chinese have diversified the potential operation sites, Bélinga iron has from the
start been the main focus and considered as the most important project. A call for tenders
was launched in 2005 and several  companies  showed interest  in winning the permit
enabling the exploitation of the Bélinga iron ore. Eventually, a Brazilian company, CVRD
(Companhia  Vale  do  Rio  Doce)  and  two  Chinese  companies,  CMEC  (China  National
Machinery Equipment Import & Export Corporation) and Sinosteel Corporation have been
the final challengers, with the aim of forming a consortium with Comilog. Following the
presentation and evaluation of their respective projects, the Gabonese government did
decide in favour of the Chinese protagonists at the expense of the Brazilian company. 
This choice has been justified by a combination of several factors. While the Chinese view
Bélinga as a priority, the Brazilian determination to exploit the mine is considered being
much lower. In terms of warranty, the Chinese companies did also diverge from their
Brazilian  counterpart.  Whereas  Brazil  turned  to  a  bank  with  predominantly  private
capital, the Chinese government itself vouched for the project by using public funds via
its  Eximbank  and  added  development  insurance20.  Delays  given  by  the  Chinese,
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particularly for the construction of connected infrastructures, also seemed shorter. In
regards to job creation and employment opportunities, a sector of utmost importance for
the Gabonese government, the Chinese offer appeared to be more consistent. 
The signing of the framework agreement, in regards to the exploitation, has defined the
different stages of the project as well as the distribution of tasks and responsibilities. As
previously mentioned, the launching of extractive activities requires the creation of a
company  incorporated  in  Gabon.  This  has  led  to  the  creation  of  a  company  named
Comibel (Compagnie minière de Bélinga), set up to manage the operation of the mine. The
following diagram shows the  involvement  of  the  Chinese  government  in  the  project
management.  From  a  Gabonese  perspective,  the  most  pregnant  point  concerns  the
repayment of the Chinese investment, which will be guaranteed by the exploitation of the
mine21.
 
Illustration 2 – Task allocation concerning the implementation of the Belinga project
Source : data collected on gabonews.ga, 2006.
The launching of  the operation depends however on the outcome of the preliminary
work, initially supposed to take between three and four years. First of all, the mine needs
energy to run and it is necessary to build accommodations for the future operators. The
construction of a hydroelectric dam in Ogooué-Ivindo (with a capacity of 50 megawatts),
carried out by CMEC will guarantee the power supply of the mine. The surplus will be
allocated to the entire province. Simultaneously, there is another hydroelectric project
(the  ‘Grand Poubara’  dam)  located  in  the  province  of  Haut-Ogooué  (cf.  map)  with  a
capacity  of  250  megawatts,  conducted  by  Sinohydro,  particularly  known  for  having
developed  the  Three  Gorges  Dam in  China.  This  significant  project  will  provide  the
necessary energy for both mining sites in Okondja and Franceville as well as address the
province’s shortage of electricity. Since the production capacity will by far exceed the
provincial  consumption,  the  surplus  will  be  evacuated  to  the  capital  Libreville  and
enhance a power networking at the scale of the country. Nevertheless, the dam projects
remain closely  related to  the  mining sites  and are  primarily  designed to  assure  the
functioning of these activities. 
At the same time, logistics is essential to assure a consistent transportation of the iron
ore. To face these challenges, the project includes the construction of two railways ramps
of a total length of 560 km – one leading from Booué to Bélinga, the other from Ntoum to
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Santa Clara – and both connected to the Transgabonais (cf. map). The railway line will
lead to a future deepwater port at Santa Clara, able to manage the export of 20 million
tons according to production estimations of the mining site. 
The  overall  cost  of  the  preliminary  infrastructure  –  the  Ivindo  dam  project,  the
deepwater port and the railway connections – amounts to approximately 2.2 billion € and
is fully advanced by the CMEC company and the Chinese government. The revenues from
the exploitation of the Bélinga mine will cover the repayment of all parallel investments.
Besides the iron ore reserves, it is also hoped to find precious metals, including gold. 
While the existence of the Bélinga mine has been known since 1895, its exploitation has
been  judged  non  profitable  by  Western  companies22.  Nevertheless,  for  the  Chinese
market,  the project  holds high strategic value.  Through the provision of  large sums,
‘package deals’ and incentives to finance long-term commitments – unprofitable in the
short term – Chinese parastatals benefit from the influence and involvement of their
government. Consequently, they do not attach the same level of importance to economic
efficiency in the short term as private OECD companies would (Soares de Oliveira, 2008,
p. 107). To some extent, this also marks the current difference with Western donors and
companies, primarily guided by the pursuit of short-term profit (Soares de Oliveira, 2008)
23.
15 Whether  in  terms  of  impact  on  the  Gabonese  economy  or  the  linked  development
potential  at  a  regional  and  local  scale,  a  project  of  such  proportions  raises  many
questions. Hence, during the phases of contract negotiation, the actors involved must
take into account challenges of different natures.
 
Effects of the Bélinga project in a context of
attempted economic diversification 
16 Since  the  beginning  of  oil  production  in  Gabon  in  the  late  1950s,  the  economic
dependency on oil revenues has only been increasing. In recent years, oil made up more
than half of the State revenues, 53 per cent of its GDP and counted for 82 per cent of the
country’s exports in 2009 (Gaboneco.com, 27th of March 2009).  Despite the significant
revenues generated during the “Glorious Twelve” (Pourtier, 1989), the latter have not
encouraged a diversification of the economy; worse, they rather deepened the structural
problems and weakened further development possibilities. By gaining oil royalties, other
sectors such as industries, logging, mining and tourism have been neglected over the past
30 years (Katendi, Lescot et al. 2006). 
Even so, a certain number of major infrastructures such as the Transgabonais (at the time,
the backbone of the country in terms of communication),  the port in Owendo or the
Mvengue airport in Franceville have been financed by oil revenues. Yet, first attempts to
diversify the domestic economy have failed. 
Eventually, the oil royalties redistribution system, which allowed running a country made
up of a plethora of state officials and managed by the Bongo clan, was finally undermined
(Pourtier,  1989).  Since the 1986 oil  glut,  the IMF and the World Bank have imposed
structural  adjustment  measures,  which  have  not  really  contributed  to  significantly
reduce Gabon’s public debt24. During the same period, the poverty level increased and the
living conditions of the population deteriorated. If the explosion in oil prices, especially
after 2003, has initially helped to maintain or even boost Gabon’s oil-related revenues, it
merely  compensates  for  a  gradual  reduction  of  production  levels.  Concerned by  the
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fading of its oil reserves, Gabon has embarked on a new attempt to diversify its economy,
both to address the structural problems of the country and to prepare for its post-oil era. 
In recent years, with the support of the World Bank, Gabon has engaged in vast reforms
in order to revitalize its economy. This has resulted in the establishment of an investment
charter in 1998 aiming to attract foreign capital, as well as a socio-economic development
strategy based on the expansion of the private sector. To complete this project, the focus
is directed towards priority sectors and alternative to oil, such as mining, eco-tourism, a
new forest  policy and fishing,  but  without  neglecting or  abandoning the oil  sector25.
However, the emphasis is put on areas that require large investments to be profitable.
Regarding this point,  Chinese increasing interests and Gabon’s ambition for economic
diversification meet indirectly. 
17 If  mining  resources  in  Central  Africa  have  so  far  only  been  partially  exploited,  the
growing Chinese needs in the field of raw materials entitle Gabon to gather the necessary
investment capital to launch large-scale projects in this sector. The Bélinga project is a
significant example, particularly regarding infrastructure and job creation. 
On one hand,  the connection to the railway and establishment  of  further  roads  will
intensify the communication network – until now very insufficient – and help open up
the  isolated  province  of  Ogooué-Ivindo26.  In  this  context,  the  mentioned  transport
infrastructures, linking the mine to the coast, may also act as a structural axis for the
country as a whole.
Resolving  the  unemployment  problem reflects  however  the  biggest  challenge  of  this
project. According to different state officials, the creation of direct and indirect jobs –
related to the development of the mine and other infrastructure – is estimated at about
30,000, of which 26,000 would be reserved for the Gabonese27. 
By qualifying Bélinga as “project of the century”, former president Omar Bongo aimed to
attach a special importance to the employment section. Hence, hiring procedures as well
as  a  training  component  were  included28.  Upon signing  the  contract  during  the  last
quarter of 2006, a number of tasks were defined: the Chinese firms agreed to integrate a
number  of  qualified  Gabonese  into  the  workforce  and  provide  opportunities  for
continuing education. As for the Gabonese authorities,  they committed themselves to
establish training courses in relation to the labours and jobs required for the project. In
order  to  circumvent  potential  future  problems  –  either  of  communicative  nature  or
differences in working techniques – the Gabonese government also planned to select a
certain number of engineers and technicians to be sent to China for training. 
The use and benefit of hiring local employees lies in the duration of such operations.
Whether  for  private  companies  or  parastatals,  it  is  cheaper  to  encourage  local
employment than bringing in Chinese workforce in terms of profitability in the long run29
.  Following such an operation process over a period of activity of about 20 years, the
operating company would employ Chinese workers at  the beginning before gradually
replacing them by skilled Gabonese workers trained in specific areas in the meantime.
Given the preliminary phase of infrastructure development, initially fixed between three
to  four  years,  the  labour  market  in  Gabon  would  have  time  to  adapt  to  the  job
applications  required  for  this  project.  In  addition,  the  Bélinga  project  envisages  the
possibility of creating an industrial complex, which could have a significant impact on a
local scale.
The Gabonese people need however to adopt a change in their mentality in order to seize
every opportunity linked to Bélinga30.The economy based on oil royalties accelerated the
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development of a “rentier mentality” already initiated by the timber exploitation during
the 1950s. Gabon’s money distribution logics as well as the import of most consumption
goods, has neither encouraged the diversification of its domestic employment nor of its
economic structure. Under the effect of 30 years of oil revenues, manual labour has been
devaluated31.  It is therefore questionable whether broad-based industrialization in the
short run may be a development factor for such a sparsely populated country. 
18 Apart from the mine exploitation, there are downstream effects linked to this project,
which can generate an increase in traffic, flows of goods and people in the Ogooué-Ivindo
province. With the potential arrival of several thousand people, this phenomenon sets a
platform  for  indirect  jobs  in  different  areas  such  as  agriculture  and  food  supply.
Moreover, indirect jobs are more likely to promote the development of one of the most
remote and under-equipped provinces of the country. As examples, one could mention
the  modernization  and  strengthening  of  agricultural  technologies,  the  expansion  of
trade, the construction of roads and infrastructure as well as an increase of logging. 
Through  the  Bélinga  project,  two  possible  trajectories  seem  to  turn  up:  one  is  the
formation of an enclave with a simple mining town, built from scratch but disconnected
from its surroundings; the other as a graft with a city – certainly in relation with the mine
– but able to diversify its economy32 (Magrin, Van Vliet, 2005). Gabonese authorities –
both at national and local levels – have to assume their responsibilities, encourage this
process and various initiatives in order to make sure that the province benefits from
spillover. The main goal is to create a stable and viable economic base outside the mining
sector. Another way to encourage the setting up and development of a sustainable growth
area would be to develop Makokou – the administrative centre of the province with an
approximate current population of 13,600 inhabitants – and connect the city to Bélinga
through an efficient transportation system.
Be it for the construction or the operating phase, the role of the Gabonese government is
crucial in making sure that as many local economic players as possible get involved in the
project and in encouraging the use of local materials (cement, timber…). Furthermore,
the implementation of hiring nationals with required qualifications, the supervision of
both  activities  and  the  development  plan,  the  allocation of  bank  loans  and  the
enforcement of the contract procedures form the essential domains of the government’s
task33.  The  negotiation  phase  prior  to  the  signing  of  a  contract  is  therefore  very
important.  A  number  of  preliminary  studies,  taking  into  account  the  working
arrangements, the financing, the hiring of local workforce, the distribution of tasks as
well as the environmental impacts, need to be carried out. Generally, once the contract is
signed – depending on the prevailing balance of power – it becomes more difficult to
amend certain sections and the civil society has a hard time defending its interests.
19 However, since the signing of the contract in late 2006, several points of disagreement
remain and few concomitant events have caused the postponement of the project. The
death of Omar Bongo, the continuous price fluctuations of the iron ore as well as requests
from NGOs and the civil society, show the complexity and difficulties of implementing
such a project.
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Towards the questioning of a project of declining
interest?
20 If the promise for a rapid exploitation of the mine helped to work in China’s favour at the
beginning, it is precisely the delays in execution, which could ultimately cause them to
lose the contract. The construction phase has finally started, but the project evolves at a
very slow pace,  leading to doubts about China’s ability and willingness to honour its
commitments.
21 Omar Bongo had been lobbying intensively for the Chinese, especially in the months prior
to the signing. Since his death, they no longer seem to enjoy a privileged position. Shortly
after the completion of the contract, some referred to it as a “contract of shame” or a
mere “sales contract” of 1,600 billion CFA francs, which the Gabonese authorities had sold
off to CMEC and Eximbank. This sum corresponds to the loan, granted by Eximbank to
Comibel. 
Since the amount is entirely funded by the Chinese side, the latter will hold between 85 to
90 per cent of the capital, leaving only 10 to 15 per cent to the Gabonese government. In
exchange,  the  Chinese  actors  benefit  from a  number  of  advantages  and preferential
treatment regarding the exploitation of the natural resources. The Gri-Gri International,
a satirical Gabonese newspaper, has criticized the Gabonese government’s commitment to
“grant an exemption from all taxes for Comibel, including turnover taxes and revenues,
as well as regarding the import of materials used and directly linked to the project for a
period of 25 years”. 
Apart  from  several  points  of  disagreement  between  involved  Gabonese  and  Chinese
players, more and more voices of criticism from civil society and local NGO’s have been
raised  against  a  contract  perceived  to  be  largely  favouring  the  Chinese  side.  These
discontents  are  primarily  directed  towards  environmental  aspects  and  doubts  about
economic benefits for the local population34. In order to respond to this wave of pressure,
the Gabonese government has ensured addressing these two issues in particular. It is only
in  December  2009,  three  years  after  winning  the  tender  that  the  Chinese  operators
delivered  technical  feasibility  and  environmental  impact  studies  to  the  Gabonese
authorities  for  approval.  The  Gabonese  requested  this  action  in  order  to  ratify  the
agreement signed in 2006. 
To avoid frightening off potential investors, the Gabonese government has initially not
been inclined to set the standards too high. Through the above mentioned pressure from
the civil society and the persistence of a number of disputes, the authorities in charge are
already considering a renegotiation of the contract (Gaboneco, 2nd of April 2010). Being
uncertain  of  the  Chinese’s  ability  to  honour  their  commitment  makes  some  people
wonder if it might have been preferable to conclude an agreement with the Brazilian
company CVRD, seen as having the necessary expertise for such a project (Dougeli, 4th of
January 2010). The persisting interest from Brazil for this project (Gaboneco, 12th of April
2010) makes it possible for the Gabonese authorities to be more demanding in some areas
and shows  a  certain  reversal  in  the  balance  of  power  between the  different  parties
involved. As long as Gabon has not ratified the agreement, cancelling it and thus enabling
the Brazilian comeback remains an option.
It is in this uncertain context that a Chinese delegation arrived in Libreville in April 2010,
aiming to resolve several stumbling blocks related to cooperation projects between the
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two countries. During this visit, several projectswere signed and the Chinese government
agreed on further donations and grants.  Although the Bélinga project  represents the
major bone of contention between the two parties, it is interesting to note that the press
coverage made no reference regarding this issue. Indirectly, it reveals China’s persistent
attachment towards a donation policy. At the same time, this charm operation shows that
China is  not  letting go so easily;  however there is  no evidence that  the Chinese are
actually going to carry it out. 
From a purely economic point of view, the current setting raises the question of whether
the Bélinga project portrays a new form of barter with loans secured by the exploitation
of the iron ore.  Facing a very long repayment period of the loan,  linked to a strong
dependency on iron price fluctuations35, one wonders what will be the tangible benefits
for Gabon in an area where the return on investment is rather limited in the short run. In
the  meantime,  another  concern  is  the  maintenance  and  above  all  the  utility  of  the
project-related infrastructures after 25 years of operation36. If Gabon’s main objective is
to reduce its dependency on oil royalties by opting for a sectoral economic widening –
albeit primarily focused on mining – neither the functioning nor the structures of the
economy have experienced essential transformations. Under these conditions, shifting
away from the rentier model seems very difficult and not really foreseeable.
Soon after Hu Jintao’s visit in 2004, some local newspapers already wondered if China
could help Gabon elaborate alternative development strategies in order to get out of the
economic crisis  (Meye,  11th of  March  2004).  On  one  hand,  by  focusing on  natural
resources, China’s cooperation policy can be seen as a mere continuation of economic
strategies  once  deployed  by  Western  powers.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  put  this
phenomenon into perspective, which in the case of Africa has very rarely led to a broad-
based  development.  Nevertheless,  if  implemented,  the  Bélinga  mining project  could
eventually expand over the years and lead to a wider economic outlook37.  
 
Conclusion
22 Chinese presence in Gabon has been steadily increasing since 2006 due to the scale and
expectations linked to the Bélinga project. Beyond the actual operating of the mine, the
large sums invested in infrastructure development stress the importance of the project.
Having established diplomatic relations with Gabon since the 1960s, the People’s Republic
of China is far from being a new player in this country. It is however the combination of
China’s  growing  demand  for  natural  resources  and  the  desire  for  diversification  of
Gabon’s economy that has led to an intensification of Sino-Gabonese relations. 
If the Bélinga project reflects the entanglement of political and economic interests, the
persistence of a set of disagreements, particularly in the field of local employment and
the environment, has been delaying the carrying out.  Rising voices amongst the civil
society request the renegotiation of a contract being perceived as too advantageous to the
Chinese side. After all, as showed by the Gabonese case, the preferential political ties and
financial support from the Chinese government are not necessarily a guarantee for a
rapid enforcement.
In  regards  to  potential  spillover,  restructuring  of  the  economy  or  geographical
reorganization at both regional and national level, the stakes are high. Given the nature
of the contract – resembling a new form of barter with the parallel infrastructures being
reimbursed by the extraction of the ore – benefits for the Gabonese economy appear to be
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limited in the short run. Despite infrastructure development at different scales, Gabon’s
diversification attempt centred around the mining sector is for the moment not leading
to a major structural change of its economy. If possibilities for project expansion exist,
future challenges will still remain high and require a change of the Gabonese mentality.
The study of the Chinese involvement within the Gabonese extractive sector shows the
continuous implication of the Chinese State through financial and diplomatic support of
its  parastatals  in  sectors  considered  as  strategic.  If  this  procedure  has  been  quite
successful  to win tenders across the African continent,  the present case reveals  that
current enforcement dynamics depict a much more complex situation. Hence, the Bélinga
project illustrates the evolution and shifting of the balance of power contingent on the
local  and international  context.  After  heavily  relying  on the  Chinese  government  to
secure investments in the extractive sector,  the companies involved might ultimately
adopt more profit-orientated and individual strategies in the long run. It is imaginable
that those recent developments in Gabon exceed the mere example of this case study and
reflect a changing Chinese approach towards mining activities in Africa over the years to
come. 
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NOTES
1.  All of them are characterized by substantial territories and share the same interest for natural
resources, essential for the pursuit of their domestic growth.
2.  As Chris Alden puts it “ While the drive to secure energy resources is at the heart of Beijing’s
renewed  engagement  with  Africa,  there  is  nonetheless  a  growing  depth  and  complexity  to
relations that bears closer analysis” (Alden, 2005).
3.  Gabon is globally characterised by a poor communication network. The total railway network
amounts to 810 km since 2005 for a country which covers an area of more than 267,000 square
km. At the same time, the percentage of paved roads is estimated at only 10% in 2004 (from 2005
up to now, no precise data is to be found). 
4.  If  Cappocia and Kelemen have discussed these concepts extensively, Magrin and van Vliet
have applied it to natural resources. See Rosser (2006), for a more detailed synthesis about the
resource curse debate.
5.  The most relevant studies on the Chinese engagement in Gabon’s extractive sector have been
conducted by Yates (2008) and Alves (2008). Parallel to these, a number of reports have been
conducted by the Centre for Chinese Studies in South Africa (November 2007, August 2009).
6.  Bongo has not only been in close contact with all the French presidents of the fifth Republic
but  also  maintained  privileged  economic  and  political  relations  with  the  former  colonizer.
Considered  by  some  as  a  “French  puppet”,  Omar  Bongo  had  gained  tremendous  political
influence and strength over the decades of rule. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, see
Yates  (2008).  Even  though  Omar  Bongo  has  (also)  either  visited  or  received  all  the  Chinese
political leaders from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao, the former links to France cannot be compared
to the current rise of Sino-Gabonese relations.
7.  In 1995, Gabon’s trade with China totals at 89 million €. Between 2005 and 2006, bilateral trade
doubles from 274 to 622 million € and reveals the increasing potential between the two countries.
This tendency continues until 2008 (1.36 billion €) before falling back to 612 million € in 2009
(World Trade Atlas Data, 2010).
8.  Comilog ( Compagnie Minière de l’Ogooué ) is a Gabonese business subsidiary of the French
mining and metallurgic group Eramet,  operating in the manganese exploitation and plays an
important role in the Gabonese economy. Established in 1953, the shares are initially subdivided
between US Steel and French investors. Progressively, the Gabonese State acquires a share in
1974, and in 1999 Eramet takes over the interests of US Steel and other European investors. By
2003, Eramet holds 61% of the stock while the Gabonese state keeps 27% (Yates, 2008, p. 214). In
November  2005,  Eramet  obtains  a  30  years  concession  for  the  Transgabonais  railway and in
October 2010 the mining company signs an agreement with the Republic of Gabon on increasing
its stake in the company Comilog (Eramet website, date of access, 9th of May 2011). 
9.  For comparison, imports from France amounted to approximately 562 million € in 2007; those
from the United States to 92 million € (African Statistical Yearbook, 2010, p. 201).
10.  Website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Maison des Français de l’étranger”, [date
of access, 29 of January 2011.
11.  That being said, the combination between political and economic affairs is far from being
specific to China-Africa relations. See Alden, Davies (2006) for a more detailed discussion on this
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topic.  Furthermore, it  is  necessary to separate Chinese parastatals,  which are enjoying broad
support from the Chinese government, from private entities which are not necessarily or entirely
pursuing the priorities and methods defined by the Chinese state.
12.  See He Wenping (2009).
13.  In 2004, China has already been the third largest buyer of Gabonese crude oil/year behind
the United States and France (Yates, 2008, p. 208). 
14.  In 2006,  Gabon’s GNI per capita amounted to 3,500 €,  roughly more than four times the
average of African countries that same year (755 €), (African Development Bank, 2008). However,
the income inequality is considerable.
15.  However,  by  choosing  Paris  for  his  first  official  visit,  newly  elected  President  Bongo
demonstrated the ongoing predominant role of France in Gabonese foreign policy (RFI, 19th of
November 2009).
16.  Interview with Paul Tongui – Gabonese Minister of Foreign Affairs, – on www.cooperation-
internationale.com in connection with the 35 years of Sino-Gabonese cooperation (20th of April
2009).
17.  In  regards  to  Sino-African  contracts,  especially  within  the  extractive  sector,  it  is  either
impossible or very difficult to get access to detailed information. Negotiations between Chinese
parastatal companies and African governments are most of the time characterised by an opaque
environment and the number of actors involved are quite limited. 
18.  CICMH  stands  for  Huazhou  Industrial  and  Commercial  Mining  Company,  a  partnership
between China’s Ningbo Huaneng Kuangye and Huazhou Mining Investment Company (Centre
for Chinese Studies, 2007, p. 84).
19.  According to the Gabonese Mining Code, activities in this sector (covering exploitation and
marketing) can only be carried out by corporations displaying at least 51% of national shares
(Enforcement Decree of the Mining Code, 2000, p. 17).
20.  The involvement of the Chinese state as well as the support for its parastatals is a common
scenario when it comes to areas identified as strategic for the Chinese economy.
21.  The estimated reserves of the mine amount to one billion tons with an iron concentration
between 64% and 68%. According to various sources, the site of Bélinga is “one of the last major
untapped  iron  deposits  in  the  world”  (www.lesechos.fr/info/industrie/afp_00246494-fer-de-
belinga-nouvell  es-discussions-entre-la-chine-et-le-gabon.htm;  date of  access,  25th  of  January
2011). If the quantity of iron ore is not sufficient to repay the credit, the Chinese part has made
sure  to  include  an  additional  decree  in  the  contract  requiring  other  possible  methods  of
compensation from the Gabonese government (Okimi, 25th of October 2007).
22.  A first consortium, in which an American company Bethlehem Steel held 50 per cent of the
shares alongside other French and German companies of SOMIFER (Société des mines de fer de
Mékambo), was initially formed during the 1950s. In 1974, the Gabonese State acquired 60 per
cent  of  the  shares  and  production  was  expected  to  start  as  soon  as  the  extension  of  the
Transgabonais would be finished. The lack of funding, the saturation of the iron market and
unprofitable  circumstances  have  however  prevented  the  project  from  being  carried  out;
subsequently all the shareholders involved pulled out (Yates, 2008, p. 216).
23.  In the longer run, we will however see that the Chinese mining activities in Gabon reflect a
more complex reality.
24.  Gabon’s public debt – although decreasing to 1.5 billion € in 2009 compared to 2.06 billion €
in 2004 – still remains at a high level (African Statistical Yearbook, 2010, p. 199).
25.  Given that the Gabonese government requires considerable funding to achieve the objectives
defined in terms of growth and poverty reduction, oil revenues still remain necessary to assure
the financing of the capital needed. 
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26.  In this very sparsely populated province, the population totals at only about 60,000 people
with a density of 1.1 inhabitants per square km. (Data collected on PopulationData.net, date of
access 15th of January 2011).
27.  With  regard  to  this  section,  no  Gabonese  source  provides  detailed  information.
Consequently,  it  remains  unclear  how many  of  those  potential  jobs  will  be  allocated  to  the
construction of infrastructure or to the operating of the project (Some sources state however
that the operation phase would generate 3,000 direct and 10,000 indirect jobs). Moreover, while
the  majority  of  the  sources  speak  of  26,000  jobs  being  reserved  for  the  Gabonese,  very  few
indications are made concerning the duration of employment as well as the allocation of the
remaining  4,000  jobs  (one  can  only  assume  that  the  latter  will  be  dedicated  to  Chinese
workforce). The major question remains to know whether the reported numbers really reflect
the reality, once the project is implemented.
28.  Measures include a policy of “gabonisation”, which aims to provide preferential employment
for the Gabonese regarding assignments that can be executed by nationals. Following the terms
of the contract,  the workforce training is not only limited to executives,  but it  also includes
technicians and other employees. 
29.  If, for a period of 25 years of operation, the company hires Chinese labour force, it will have
to adopt a rotation scheme. Thus, Chinese contractors usually only stay between two up to four
years and have the right to return home (at least) once a year, usually for the Chinese New Year.
By extrapolating  this  procedure  over  25  years,  repetitive  travels  and adaptation to  the  host
environment for newcomers will undoubtedly raise the costs of operations.
30.  “Despite the creation of about 30,000 jobs, the Gabonese will first have to show an interest in
the project and endeavour to follow courses of study and training within the fields that meet the
job offers” (Obiang, 12th of September 2006). Following the inauguration of Ali Bongo as Gabon’s
president  in  October  2009,  the  latter  “urged  the  Gabonese  population  to  adopt  a  change  of
mentality and get back to work in order to build a rich and prosperous country in a harmonious
way” (Mbog Batassi, 16th of October 2009).
31.  See Yates (1996) for a more detailed discussion about the “rentier mentality” in Gabon.
32.  In Gabon, examples of mining towns that live by the rhythm of the mine are numerous. In
Moanda as well as in Mounana, located in the Haut-Ogooué province, the mining activity has
preceded the establishment of the cities. In Mounana, the stopping of the mining activity, in an
area  where  the  economic  dynamics  have  been  largely  polarised  by  this  sector,  caused  the
abandonment of other activities resulting in the image of a ghost town. This can be explained by
the  fact  that  up  to  now  commercial  activities  and  restoration  in  Gabon,  are  predominantly
carried out by African expatriates and Lebanese. The latter are more likely to promptly withdraw
after the cessation of a large mining activity than if local people were encouraged to venture into
this field. Moanda however, another mining town built from scratch, has rapidly diversified its
economy towards trade and services, to the point of even being able to compete with Franceville
(2nd largest city in the country) for a while. 
33.  Series of interviews conducted with M. Charlemagne in Libreville in April 2007, at the time
deputy-managing director, in charge of electricity and technology development at the Ministry
of Energy, Mining and Petroleum. 
34.  In a letter, addressed to the President of China Eximbank in Beijing, Brainforest (a NGO based
in  Gabon  with  the  support  of  several  international  NGOs)  pointed  out  the  major  concerns
regarding the realisation of the Bélinga project. Among the most relevant ones, we can cite the
worries about having launched the construction phase without the publication of any impact
studies (although required by Eximbank guidelines), the lack of participatory actions from sides
of  the  Chinese  operator,  the  negative  effects  related  to  the  Ivindo  National  Park  dam
construction,  pollution  as  well  as  the  impact  on  village  communities  [http://
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www.internationalrivers.org/files/Brainforest%20letter%20to%20China%20Exim%20Bank.pdf ,
date of access 30th of March 2011].
35.  According to the Cyclope Report (2010), the evolution of the iron ore value in 2010 remained
highly unpredictable and unknown. The collapse of steel prices in the second half of 2008 due to
falling demand of Western countries had an immediate impact on the iron ore market. Iron ore
hit its lowest point in March 2009 at $ 59/ton before slowly recovering and finishing the year at a
level of $ 110/ton.
36.  It is only after this period of time that they will be owned by the Gabonese government.
37.  In matters of potential project widening, oil activities conducted by CNPC’s (China National
Petroleum Corporation)  in  Chad draw an  interesting  case  of  comparison.  Initially  limited  to
petroleum  exploitation,  the  “Rônier”  project  gradually  integrated  a  refinery  and  the
development of a linked industrial complex. See van Vliet  and Magrin eds. (2011, forthcoming)
for a more detailed discussion on this topic.
RÉSUMÉS
Depuis quelques années, le Gabon nourrit l’ambition de réduire sa dépendance envers les revenus
du  pétrole  et  de  diversifier  son  économie.  Cette  volonté  coïncide  avec  l'augmentation  des
investissements chinois dans les pays africains richement dotés en ressources. Parmi l’éventail
des relations sino-gabonaises, le secteur minier - et surtout le projet de la mine de fer de Bélinga
- se place au centre de l'intérêt des deux parties.
Sous le règne d’Omar Bongo, ce vaste projet minier avait été promu et présenté comme fleuron
de l’économie nationale. Cependant, malgré les promesses de développer les infrastructures et de
fournir des opportunités d'emploi, la tentative de diversification économique du Gabon semble
toutefois limitée et ne pas vraiment mener vers un changement structurel majeur. Un certain
nombre  de  critères  ont  par  ailleurs  retardé  la  réalisation  du  projet  Bélinga  et  introduit  de
nouveaux risques et coûts pour les Chinois. Parmi les plus révélateurs figurent la volatilité des
prix des matières premières, la mort du président Omar Bongo en 2009 ainsi que l’opposition
croissante de la société civile. L’objectif principal de cet article consiste à étudier les possibilités
de développement liées au projet et d’analyser l’approche évolutive de la Chine envers le projet
Gabon’s recent ambition to reduce its dependency on oil revenue by diversifying its economy
coincides with China’s growing investment in resource-rich African countries. Within the wide
range of Sino–Gabonese co-operation, the mining sector – and above all  the Bélinga iron ore
project – is central to both parties’ interests. 
Omar Bongo’s regime promoted this large-scale project as the flagship of the national economy.
However,  despite  the  promise  of  infrastructure  development  and employment  opportunities,
Gabon’s attempt at diversification seems limited and is not leading towards any major structural
change. A number of issues have challenged the realisation of the Bélinga project and introduced
new risks  and costs  for  the  Chinese.  These  include  commodity  price  volatility,  the  death  of
president Omar Bongo in 2009 and increasing dissent among civil  society. The paper reviews
development  opportunities  linked  to  the  the  Bélinga  project  and  analyses  China’s  evolving
approach towards the project.
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